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bastardize the child, and it advocates making blood grouping tests con-
clusive.
CHARLES R. HUDDLESON.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCF - CONTRACTS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
ATTORNEYS - CAN AN ATTORNEY RECOVER ON QUANTUM MERUIT WHEN HIs
CONTRACT OF RETAINER IS CHAMPERTOUS? - Plaintiff, an attorney, was re-
tained by a corporation to prosecute an action for a tax refund. It was agreed
plaintiff's fee was to be contingent and that he would bear the expense of pay-
ing an expert witness whose testimony was necessary for recovery. After plain-
tiff successfully prosecuted the action the client refused to pay his fee, assert-
ing that the agreement for payment of the fee of the witness was champertous.
The Second Circuit Courts of Appeals held that despite the champertous char-
acter of the express contract of retainer, plaintiff could recover the reasonable
value of his services on the theory of quantum meruit. Kamerman v. United
States, 278 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1960).
The decision is contrary to the position taken by the American Law Insti-
tute, which asserts that an attorney who performs services in pursuance of a
champertous agreement can recover neither the compensation stipulated in his
contract of retainer nor their reasonable value.' A substantial body of author-
ity honors this point of view.2  Nevertheless the more widely supported ruling
is in accord with the instant decision and allows the attorney to recover on
the basis of a quantum meruit count. 3 One writer suggests that the variation
in result among the various jurisdictions may be due to "differences in the
specific conduct of the attorneys seeking compensation." 4 Illustrative of the
force of this suggestion is a Virginia court's refusal of recovery on the ground
that what the attorney undertook to do was in itself illegal.5
Other courts have taken a middle ground and hold that the right of re-
covery on the basis of quantum meruit is present but that the void express
contract of retainer cannot be considered for the purpose of determining the
value of the services actually rendered,6 except that it may be used to limit
recovery to the amount set forth in the contract.7 In some instances it has
been stated that the contract is admissible in evidence for the purpose of in-
1. Restatement, Contracts § 545 (1932) "A person who has agreed to render services
under P bargain, illegal under the rules stated in §§ 541, 542 [Champerty and Mainten-
ance], cannot recover either the agreed compensation for his services or their reasonable
value. Nor can he retain from the proceeds acquired by enforcing the claim even reason-
able consideration."
2. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929); Merland v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84
F.2d 238 (D.D.C. 1936); Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933); Moreland
v. Devenney, 72 Kan. 471, 83 Pac. 1097 (1905); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308,
151 Atl. 542 (1930).
3. Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571 (1923); Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268
S.W. 799 (1925); In re Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82 N.E. 742 (1907); Stearns v. Felker,
28 Wis. 594 (1871). See In re Joslyn, 223 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1955); Darnell v.
Broken Bow, 139 Neb. 844, 299 N.W. 274 (1941).
4. See CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1426 at 712 (1951).
5. Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, '72 S.E. 665 (1911). See also Brush v. City of
Carbondale, 229 Ill. 144, 82 N.E. 252, 255 (1907); Gammons v. Johnson, 69 Minn. 488,
72 N.W. 563, 564 (1897).
6. Elliot v. McClelland, 17 Ala. 206 (1850); Dorr v. Camden, 55 W.Va. 226, 46
S.E. 1014 (1904).
7. Hamilton v. Burgess, 233 Ala. 4, 170 So. 348 (1936); cf. Oxborough v. St. Martin,
169 Minn. 72, 210 N.W. 854 (1926). See Freerks v. Nurnberg, 33 N.D. 587, 157 N.W.
119, 121 (1916).
RECENT CASES
dicating the party's view as to the proper consideration.8 Recovery has also
been allowed on the basis of a quantum meruit theory, but limited to the
value of services rendered before the void contract was madeY
The North Dakota Code is silent on the matter. But it has been held in this
state that no recovery can be had in quantum meruit where the services can-
not be shown to have benefited the client, the recovery being precluded where
a champertous agreement provided for a contingent fee and the litigation
failed.1o
It is submittted that to allow rccovery in cases of this type, as was done in
the instant decision, is to encourage champertous agreements. If the client
permits the illegal contract to stand, the attorney can recover the contractual
amount. If the client does not, then the attorney can recover the reasonable
value of his services. Such a result gives indirect sanction to an illegal agree-
ment and thus encourages practitioners to "take a chance." Equally, it allows
clients to exert economic pressure on practioners to finance their lawsuits.
THEODORE KESsEL, JR.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT - ACTS CONSTITUTING FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND
LIABLITY THERFORE - SHOPKEEPERS RESPONSIBILITY - NORTH DAKOTA'S
SHOPLIFTING AcT. - Plaintiff was detained by the defendant's employee, who
had observed him taking some caroid and charcoal tablets from a bottle in a
drugstore. The defendant at that time was serving in the capacity of a store
detective hired by the drugstore for the purpose of stopping shoplifters. The
detention lasted 30 to 40 minutes, during which time the defendant questioned
the plaintiff about his actions. The plaintiff brought this action for false arrest;
at the trial the jury awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $1,500.00.
On appeal, the supreme court of Nebraska held, two justices dissenting, that
the damages were excessive, but there was sufficient evidence to submit the
case to the jury. New trial granted. Hebrick v. Samardick & Co., 169 Neb.
833, 101 N.W.2d 488 (1960).
False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical
liberty of another.' The detention is a matter between private persons for a
private end.2 Generally, probable cause 3 is not a defense in an action for false
imprisonment. 4 However, some courts hold that probable cause will reduce
damages. 5 It has been held that where a person has reasonable grounds to
believe that another is stealing his property, he is justified to detain him for
a reasonable time in order to investigate.
8. See Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S.W. 322 (1899); Clark v. Gilbert, 26 N.Y.
279 (1863); cf. La Du-King Manuf'g Co. v. La Du, 36 Minn. 473, 31 N.W. 938 (1899).
9. Dreyfuss, Weil & Co. v. Jones, 116 111. App. 75 (1904); Thurston v. Percival, 50
Mass. (I Pick.) 415 (1823).
10. Freerks v. Nurnberg, 33 N.D. 587, 157 N.W. 119 (1916).
1. Rich v. Mclnery, 10 3 Ala. 345, 15 So. 663 (1894); Weiler v. Herzfeld-Phillipson
Co., 189 Wisc. 554, 208 N.W. 599 (1926).
2. Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P.2d 530 (1949).
3. Sanders v. Davis, 153 Ala. 375, 44 So. 979 (1.07). "Probable cause" for arrest,
as a defense to an action for false imprisonment, means a reasonable ground for suspicion,
supported by circumstances.
4. Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947); Titus v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 224 Mo. 177, 123 S.W.2d 574 (1939).
5. Gamier v. Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Pac. 1005 (1900); Crawford v. Huber, 215
Mich. 564, 184 N.W. 594 (1921); Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 224 Mo. 177, 123
S.W.2d 574 (1939).
6. Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936); Bettolo v. Safeway
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